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UTAH V. STRIEFF AND THE FUTURE OF
THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
ZACK GONG*
INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects people’s
rights against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”1 To enforce this
protection, the Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule, which
precludes from trials evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.2 However, the Court has recognized that the exclusionary rule
takes a heavy toll on the judicial system and society, including potentially
“setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large.”3 To alleviate such social
cost, the Court has created a series of exceptions to this rule to save certain
evidence from exclusion, in spite of the illegality in obtaining the
evidence.4
In the recent case State v. Strieff, the Supreme Court of Utah held that
police’s discovery of a lawful outstanding warrant during an unlawful
investigatory stop cannot save the evidence obtained during that arrest from
suppression under the attenuation doctrine.5 To reach that decision, the
court reasoned that the inevitable discovery doctrine, instead of the
attenuation doctrine, is appropriate for this situation.6 However, the court
failed to address whether the inevitable discovery doctrine can ultimately
save the evidence from suppression.7

* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2017.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
3. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
907 (1984)).
4. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
443 (1984).
5. See State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 546 (Utah 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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The theoretical foundation of how the Fourth Amendment guaranty
gives rise to the exclusionary rule has never been steadfast; in fact, it is
subject to constant academic debate.8 Some scholars have even predicted
the abolishment of the exclusionary rule, in light of the recent
developments and expansions of the exception doctrines.9 This commentary
will argue that, given the Court’s policy justification for the exclusionary
rule10 and the recent trend towards curbing its scope,11 the Court will likely
reverse the Supreme Court of Utah’s decision and further narrow the
application of the exclusionary rule. In Part I, this commentary lays out the
facts of this case; in Part II, it discusses the legal background of the
exclusionary rule leading up to this case; in Part III, it examines the
Supreme Court of Utah’s holding and the reasoning behind it; and in Part
IV, it provides an analysis on how the Supreme Court will rule in this case.
I. FACTS
In December 2006, Officer Douglas Fackrell received an anonymous
drug tip reporting “narcotics activity” at a South Salt Lake City residence.12
Subsequently, Officer Fackrell initiated intermittent surveillance over the
residence totaling three hours over the course of a week, during which he
observed “short term traffic” at the residence, with visitors arriving and
leaving within a few minutes.13 The traffic was not very frequent but was
more than that of a typical household and enough to raise the officer’s
suspicion of ongoing drug sales activity.14
During the surveillance, Officer Fackrell saw defendant Edward Strieff
leaving the residence and walking towards a convenience store.15 Although
he did not see Strieff entering the residence, Officer Fackrell decided to

8. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 478 (2011); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757 (1994); Rhett DeHart, Is the Exclusionary Rule Doomed?, 26-Mar. S.C. LAW. 40 (2015);
William C. Heffernan, On Justifying Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1193 (1989).
9. See Matthew Allan Josephson, To Exclude or Not to Exclude: The Future of the Exclusionary
Rule After Herring v. United States, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 175, 176 (2009) (citing No More Chipping
Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe to Take Out the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 MISS.
L.J. 1183 (2012)); DeHart, supra note 8; Candace C. Kilpinen, Herring v. United States: A Threat to
Fourth Amendment Rights?, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 747 (2010).
10. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (“The rule’s sole purpose, we have
repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”).
11. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853
(1975); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011).
12. Strieff, 357 P.3d at 536.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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“ask someone [to] find out what was going on [in] the house.”16 He
confronted Strieff and ordered him to stop in a parking lot near the
convenience store.17 After identifying himself and checking Strieff’s
identification, Officer Fackrell asked dispatch to run a warrant check on
Strieff, which revealed an outstanding traffic warrant.18 Pursuant to that
warrant, Officer Fackrell arrested Strieff, searched him and found a bag of
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in his pockets.19
Strieff was later charged with unlawful possession of
methamphetamine and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia.20 In
moving to suppress the evidence, Strieff argued that the evidence was
uncovered during the initial investigatory stop, which was unlawful
because the official lacked reasonable articulable suspicion—Officer
Fackrell did not see Strieff entering the house, and thus did not know how
long he stayed there or anything other than the fact that he left the house at
one point.21 The state conceded the unlawfulness of the stop, but argued
that the evidence should nevertheless be admitted pursuant to the
attenuation exception.22
The district court denied Strieff’s motion, reasoning that: (1) the
surveillance had created reasonable suspicion for drug activity, so the stop
“was to investigate a suspected drug house;” (2) the police officer’s
conduct was not a flagrant violation of the Fourth Amendment but a good
faith mistake; and (3) weighing all evidence together, suppression of the
evidence would be an “inappropriate remedy.”23 The Utah Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court’s decision on the ground that the discovery of a
valid warrant is a powerful intervening circumstance that would dissipate
the taint of the unlawful stop, and that the violation by the police officer
was not flagrant or purposeful.24
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 536–37.
Id.
See State v. Strieff, 286 P.3d 317, 335 (Utah Ct. App. 2012).
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unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”25 In simple
terms, the exclusionary rule dictates that evidence obtained in violation of
the Constitution is inadmissible in court. However, instead of being a
constitutional mandate or personal right, the exclusionary rule is a
judicially-created remedy to enforce the Fourth Amendment.26 In 1914, the
Court held in Weeks v. United States that the exclusionary rule is
enforceable in all federal courts.27 In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court held that this
rule is enforceable against the States through incorporation of the Fourth
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment.28
The early cases on the exclusionary rule did not lay out its theoretical
basis,29 and the rule has since been shrouded by debate and criticism. Some
scholars have even gone as far as calling its jurisprudence a total mess.30
The justifications provided by the Court for the rule have changed over the
years.31 Initially, the Court justified the rule in two ways: first, to
“discourag[e] police misconduct” and second, as “the imperative of judicial
integrity.”32 But in the following decades, through multiple landmark cases,
the Court has clarified that the sole justification for the exclusionary rule
today is to deter law enforcement officers from engaging in potentially
unconstitutional conduct.
Recognizing the undesirable effects of the exclusionary rule, the Court
developed a series of exceptions when the deterrent value of the rule cannot
be realized: (1) the independent source exception, (2) the inevitable
discovery exception, and (3) the attenuation exception.33
The first two exceptions are closely related, and they utilize a cause-in-

25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
26. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1,
10 (1995) (noting that the Constitution “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence
obtained in violation of its commands”).
27. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
28. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
29. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1983)
(“Unfortunately, the early cases fail to provide insight and guidance into the constitutional
underpinnings for the exclusionary rule.”).
30. See Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 821, 821 (2013) (“Academics and jurists of all stripes agree that the Court’s case law in this area
is a mess.”); Amar, supra note 8, at 757, 759; Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the
Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1973).
31. Josephson, supra note 9, at 179.
32. Id.
33. See generally Brent D. Stratton, The Attenuation Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: A Study
in Attenuated Principal and Dissipated Logic, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 139 (1984).
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fact analysis.34 Under the independent source doctrine, the taint on evidence
that resulted from police misconduct will be dissipated if that same
evidence is also obtained through another lawful method.35 Under the
inevitable discovery doctrine, the tainted evidence will be admitted in court
if it “ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means
even if no violation of any constitutional provision had taken place.”36 In
these two scenarios, evidence has been or would have been discovered by
separate lawful means, so the deterrent value of the rule is insufficient to
justify its application.
The third exception, the attenuation doctrine, shifts from a cause-in-fact
analysis to a proximate cause analysis.37 It permits the admission of
evidence discovered through police misconduct if the legal nexus between
the misconduct and the evidence is sufficiently attenuated.38 The logic of
this doctrine was first elaborated and clarified in Wong Sun v. United
States.39 In Wong Sun, the Court held that a defendant’s confession, made
several days after the police’s unlawful invasion of his residence, was
admissible because the connection between the misconduct and the
confession had become sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint.40 The
Court identified two key elements: first, the government did not exploit the
police wrongdoing to obtain the evidence, and second, the confession
worked as an intervening circumstance of free will.41
Later in Brown v. Illinois,42 the Court developed a three-factor test to
determine whether the attenuation doctrine is applicable: (1) the “temporal
proximity” between the unlawful police conduct and the discovery of the
evidence in question, (2) the existence of “intervening circumstances,” and
(3) the “purpose and flagrancy” of the official’s misconduct.43 A closer
temporal proximity may indicate a bigger effect of the unlawful conduct on
the collection of evidence and the potential exploitation of the conduct by
the police, thus working in favor of suppression.44 An intervening
circumstance is deemed to exist if it is “so distinct from the threshold
Fourth Amendment violation that it can be said that the challenged
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 539 (Utah 2015).
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988).
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 432 (1984).
Strieff, 357 P.3d at 540.
See Stratton, supra note 33, at 140–41.
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
Id. at 491.
See Stratton, supra note 33, at 146.
422 U.S. 590 (1975).
State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 541 (Utah 2015) (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 603–04).
Id.
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evidence is not a product of ‘exploitation’ of the illegality but instead the
result of ‘means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.’”45 And lastly, a purposeful and flagrant conduct is something
“obviously improper” and “investigatory in design and purpose and
executed in the hope that something might turn up.”46
III. HOLDING
The issue in Utah v. Strieff is whether to apply the attenuation doctrine
to the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant and thereby exempt the
evidence obtained from the lawful arrest from suppression.47 According to
the Supreme Court of Utah, all the attenuation-doctrine cases so far have
involved voluntary confessions and the U.S. Supreme Court has never
specifically decided the issue of this case.48
The Supreme Court of Utah delineated three general lines of reasoning
adopted by lower courts on this issue.49 The first group of cases,
exemplified by United States v. Green, holds that the discovery of a
preexisting warrant is an intervening circumstance sufficient to purge the
taint of the prior unlawful police conduct, provided that the unlawful
conduct itself is not flagrant.50 In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh
Circuit focused on the question of whether the deterrent function of the
exclusionary rule can be served because “application of the rule does not
serve this deterrent function when the police action, although erroneous,
was not undertaken in an effort to benefit the police at the expense of the
suspect’s protected rights.”51 The court also cited Wong Sun v. United
States, claiming that the evidence obtained from a lawful arrest pursuant to
a preexisting warrant comes not “by exploitation of that illegality [but] by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”52 In
addition to the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit and eleven state high
courts have also adopted this rationale.53
The second group of cases applied the Brown v. Illinois test, but
concluded that in the situation of a preexisting arrest warrant, attenuation

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488).
Id. (citing United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 2006)).
Id. at 535.
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 522 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id. (citing United States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 958 (7th Cir. 1990)).
Id.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373 (U.S. May 15, 2015).
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doctrine does not apply.54 In State v. Moralez,55 the court concluded that: (1)
applying the first factor, the short time between the unlawful detention and
the discovery of the warrant leads to a high temporal proximity, which
“weighs heavily” against the application, and (2) applying the third factor,
the unlawful detention followed by a warrant search demonstrated some
resemblance to an “investigatory detention designed and executed in the
hope that something might turn up” and thus exhibited “at least some level
of flagrant conduct.”56
The third line of reasoning, the one the Supreme Court of Utah adopted
in this case, is to deem the attenuation doctrine inapplicable in the situation
of a preexisting warrant.57 This rationale originated from the dissenting
opinion in State v. Frierson,58 in which Chief Justice Pariente proposed to
limit the application of the attenuation doctrine to its original basis—
situations involving a voluntary confession as a result of the independent
acts of free will of the defendant, and thus excluding the preexisting
warrant from consideration.59
The Supreme Court of Utah believed that the U.S. Supreme Court,
through several seminal cases on the attenuation doctrine—Brown, Wong
Sun, Kaupp—indicated that the application of this doctrine is restricted to
cases where the intervening cause is a voluntary confession of the
defendant that breaks the legal proximate causation between the discovery
of evidence and the initial police misconduct.60
The court provided two reasons to back up this claim: (1) the Brown
factor test works to exclude a preexisting warrant situation from
application—both the “temporal proximity” and the “purpose and
flagrancy” factors focus on a proximate causation inquiry, and a warrant
check is hardly an unforeseeable or superseding event after an unlawful
detention; (2) the scenario of this case fits better with the doctrine of
inevitable discovery, which covers evidence that will inevitably be
discovered by a line of lawful police work separated from the unlawful
detention—in this case, the execution of the legitimate warrant.61 The court

54. State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 543 (Utah 2015; see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590
(1975).
55. 300 P.3d 1090 (Kan. 2013).
56. Strieff, 357 P.3d at 543 (citing Moralez, 300 P.3d at 1103).
57. Id.
58. 926 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 2006).
59. Strieff, 357 P.3d at 543 (citing Frierson, 926 So.2d at 1149–50 (Pariente, C.J., dissenting)).
60. Id.
61. State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015) (“[W]e deem the inevitable discovery doctrine
to control.”).
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believed extending the coverage of the attenuation doctrine here would
“eviscerate the inevitable discovery exception.”62 Thus, the Supreme Court
of Utah reversed the lower court decision regarding the invocation of this
doctrine.63
IV. ANALYSIS
Through a series of recent holdings, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the exclusionary rule has been shifting towards limiting
the rule’s scope and power. Both Strieff and Utah have cited these seminal
Supreme Court cases and considered the arguments in those cases in
forming their own arguments.64
In Hudson v. Michigan, the Detroit police force violated the knock-andannounce rule because after announcing their presence, they waited only
“three to five seconds” before breaking in Hudson’s house to execute a
legitimate search warrant on narcotics and weapons.65 Facing the issue of
whether a violation of the knock-and-announce rule would result in the
suppression of all the evidence obtained in the search, the Court, by a vote
of 5-4, held that the exclusionary rule is not a proper remedy for a violation
of the knock-and-announce rule.66
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia stressed that the suppression of
evidence “has always been our last resort, not our first impulse,” and that it
shall only apply when its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social
cost, including setting dangerous criminals free.67 Because “the value of
deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit the
forbidden act” and violating the knock-and-announce rule provides the
police with little expected value and thus little incentive to commit the
violation, the deterrence value here is too little to justify the suppression of
evidence.68
In Herring v. New York, a police officer arrested Herring based on a
warrant in the neighboring county’s database, and a search incident to
arrest revealed methamphetamine and an illegal pistol.69 However,

62. Id. at 545.
63. Id.
64. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2015);
Respondent’s Brief in Opposition, Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373 (U.S. June 30, 2015).
65. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 586–88 (2006).
66. Id. at 586.
67. Id. at 591.
68. Id. at 596.
69. Herring v. New York, 555 U.S. 135, 138 (2009).
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unbeknownst to the officer, the warrant had been recalled months earlier
and the recall was not entered into the system due to a police mistake.70
The U.S. Supreme Court, by another 5-4 vote, ruled against the
suppression of the evidence, reasoning that the police officer’s conduct in
that case was not “sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully
deter it [or] sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price
paid by the justice system.”71 The Court laid out the exclusionary rule as a
remedy reserved for “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or
in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence,” and concluded
that a suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for the simple
negligence mistake.72
The Herring rationale was further confirmed by another case, Davis v.
United States.73 In Davis, the police arrested Willie Davis during a routine
vehicle stop for giving a false name, and in the search of Davis’s car
incident to arrest, the police found an illegal weapon.74 The police search of
the vehicle complied with relevant appellate precedent at the time, but as
Davis appealed his case to a federal court of appeals, the U.S. Supreme
Court announced a new rule governing searches of vehicles incident to
arrests of recent occupants,75 which made the police search of Davis’s car
illegal.76
Because the police officer in Davis was neither negligent nor culpable
and thus suppressing the evidence had no meaningful effect, the U.S.
Supreme Court, by a vote of 7-2, held that the exclusionary rule was not
applicable.77 The Court continued to stress how rare the exclusionary rule
should be applied and how a good faith or simple and isolated mistake of
the police should not result in suppression of the evidence found.78
Applying the rationale of the above cases to Utah v. Strieff, the answer
seems readily evident. The mistake made in this case was non-systemic and
non-recurring. Prior to the stoppage, the officer had the house under
surveillance for a week and observed sufficient short-term traffic to believe
that he had enough evidence to establish reasonable suspicion about

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 144.
Id.
131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
Id.
See generally Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426.
Id.
Id.
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potential drug activities.79 Although this belief was later held to be
incorrect, the officer was merely one fact short from having a sufficient
legal basis to stop Strieff: he did not see Strieff entering the residence under
surveillance.80 As the district court held, such a misjudgment with minimal
culpability by the officer is a “good faith mistake on the part of the officer
as to the quantum of evidence needed to justify an investigatory
detention,”81 and by any standard, the Court should not characterize such an
action as “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent.”82 Thus, the
exclusionary rule should not be the proper remedy.
Moreover, the above line of cases limiting the application of the
exclusionary rule triggered discussion about the future of the rule and its
possible abolishment,83 especially when the very justification of the
exclusionary rule—its deterrent effect on police misconduct—can hardly be
empirically proven and is hotly debated. In fact, some studies show that the
imposition of such rules actually increased crime rates.84 Because of the
questionable efficacy of the current ex post remedies, scholars have started
to shift their attention to the alternative ex ante prevention of Fourth
Amendment violations.85 Overall, it seems that the reasons for which the
exclusionary rule was originally created have already expired—the U.S.
police force today has taken people’s constitutional rights more seriously
and generally obeys the Fourth Amendment requirement,86 and the
ubiquitous coverage of mass media has also served to deter police
misconduct. Thus, it is likely that the Court will continue to limit the
application of the exclusionary rule by reversing the decision of the
Supreme Court of Utah.
CONCLUSION
Since its creation, the exclusionary rule, an ex post remedy deterring
79. Id.
80. State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536–37 (Utah 2015).
81. Id. at 535.
82. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
83. See generally Dehart, supra note 9.
84. See Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1365, 1383 (2008) (“[T]he imposition of the exclusionary rule increased violent crimes by 27
percent and property crimes by 20 percent.”).
85. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 1609 (2012) (arguing that a serious ex ante warrant requirement will be much clearer and more
effective than a deterrence model). But see David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can
Reinforce—or Replace—the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149 (2009)
(arguing that criminology studies have shown that the exclusionary rule still possesses its unique
deterrence value).
86. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006).
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police violation of the Fourth Amendment, has been subject to controversy
due to its uncertain legal foundation and questionable effectiveness. In the
past decade the Supreme Court has navigated the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence towards a much more limited application of the exclusionary
rule, applying it only to those cases where the police misconduct was
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent. Thus, applying this rationale to
the facts in Utah v. Strieff, the Supreme Court is should consider Officer
Fackrell’s misconduct to be a good-faith misjudgment, and decide that the
exclusionary rule is not a proper remedy for it.

